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Abstract
We develop an effective generation of adversarial
attacks on neural models that output a sequence
of probability distributions rather than a sequence
of single values. This setting includes the recently
proposed deep probabilistic autoregressive fore-
casting models that estimate the probability distri-
bution of a time series given its past and achieve
state-of-the-art results in a diverse set of appli-
cation domains. The key technical challenge we
address is effectively differentiating through the
Monte-Carlo estimation of statistics of the joint
distribution of the output sequence. Additionally,
we extend prior work on probabilistic forecasting
to the Bayesian setting which allows conditioning
on future observations, instead of only on past
observations. We demonstrate that our approach
can successfully generate attacks with small in-
put perturbations in two challenging tasks where
robust decision making is crucial – stock market
trading and prediction of electricity consumption.
1. Introduction
Deep probabilistic autoregressive models have been recently
integrated into the Amazon SageMaker toolkit and success-
fully applied to various kinds of sequential data such as
handwriting (Graves, 2013), speech and music (Oord et al.,
2016a), images (Oord et al., 2016c;b) and time series from
a number of different domains (Salinas et al., 2019). At
a high level, given a sequence of input values (i.e., pen-tip
locations, raw audio signals or stock market prices), the
goal is to train a generative model that outputs an accurate
sequence of next values, conditioned on all the previous
values. The main benefit of such probabilistic models is that
they model the joint distribution of output values, rather than
predicting only a single best realization (i.e., the most likely
value at each step). Predicting a density rather than just a
single best value has several advantages – it naturally fits
1Department of Computer Science, ETH Zu¨rich, Switzer-
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the inherently stochastic nature of many processes, allows
to assess the uncertainty and the associated risk, and has
been shown to produce better overall prediction accuracy
when used in forecasting tasks (Salinas et al., 2019).
This Work We develop an efficient approach for gen-
erating adversarial attacks on deep probabilistic autore-
gressive models. The issue of adversarial robustness and
attacks (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014),
i.e., generating small input perturbations that lead to mis-
predictions, is an important problem with large body of
recent work. Yet, to our best knowledge this is the first work
that explores adversarial attacks in a new challenging setting
where the neural network output is a sequence of probability
distributions. The difficulty in generating adversarial attacks
in this setting is that it requires computing the gradient of
an expectation that it is too complex to be analytically inte-
grated (Schittenkopf et al., 2000; Salinas et al., 2019) and is
approximated using Monte-Carlo methods.
Differentiating through Monte-Carlo estimation of the
Expectation We address the key technical challenge of ef-
ficiently differentiating through the Monte-Carlo estimation,
a necessary part of generating white-box gradient based ad-
versarial attacks, by using two techniques to approximate the
gradient of the expectation. The first approach is the score-
function estimator (Glynn, 1990; Kleijnen & Rubinstein,
1996) obtained by inverting the gradient and the expecta-
tion’s integral. The second technique differentiates individ-
ual samples using a random variate reparametrizatrion and
originates from the variational inference literature (Salimans
et al., 2013; Kingma & Welling, 2013; Rezende et al., 2014).
Main Contributions We present the first approach for gen-
erating adversarial attacks on deep probabilistic autoregres-
sive models by applying two techniques that differentiate
through Monte-Carlo estimation of an expectation. We show
that the reparametrization estimator is efficient at generat-
ing adversarial attacks and outperforms the score-function
estimator by evaluating on two domains that benefit from
stochastic sequential reasoning – stock market trading and
electricity consumption. We make our code, datasets and
scripts to reproduce our experiments available online1.
1https://github.com/eth-sri/
probabilistic-forecasts-attacks
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2. Probabilistic Forecasting Models
In this section, we formally describe the probabilistic au-
toregressive model used in prior works and throughout this
paper. Most notably, the model described in Section 2.1 is
based on the recent work of DeepAR (Salinas et al., 2019),
which is now an inherent part of the Amazon SageMaker
toolkit. Further, in Section 2.2 we describe an extension of
this model to the Bayesian setting proposed in our work.
2.1. Sequence Modeling: Preliminaries
Given a sequential process p = (pt)1≤t0≤T and an index t0,
we consider the task of modeling the distribution of pre-
dicted (future) values pt0:T = (pt0 , . . . , pT ) given the ob-
served (past) values p1:t0−1 = (p1, . . . , pt0−1). Using the
chain rule, the joint distribution of predicted values condi-
tioned on observed values Pr[pt0:T |p1:t0−1] can be written
as a product of conditional distributions:
Pr[pt0:T |p1:t0−1] =
T∏
i=t0
Pr[pi|p1:i−1] (1)
In deep autoregressive models, a neural network is used to
approximate the conditional distribution Pr[pi|p1:i−1] by
a parametric distribution qθ[pi|p1:i−1] specified by learnable
parameters θ. This yields a joint model:
qθ[pt0:T |p1:t0−1] =
T∏
i=t0
qθ[pi|p1:i−1] (2)
This decomposed form for the joint distribution is general
and independent of the particular neural architecture chosen
for qθ. In principle, any type of sequential model can be used
including well-known architectures such as LSTMs (Hochre-
iter & Schmidhuber, 1997), Temporal Convolutional Net-
works (Bai et al., 2018) or Transformers (Vaswani et al.,
2017). Next, we describe a LSTM based instantiation of
probabilistic autoregressive models.
Probabilistic Autoregressive Models Let h be a function
implemented by a LSTM network. Given h, we compute
the hidden state hi = h(hi−1, pi−1, θ) for each time-step,
conditioned on the previous hidden state hi−1, previous
input value pi−1 and the network parameters θ. Then, the
hidden state hi is used to generate a set of parameters ψ(hi)
that specify a distribution with density `ψ(hi)(pi), giving
the following form for the conditional distribution:
qθ[pt0:T |p1:t0−1] =
T∏
i=t0
`ψ(hi)(pi) (3)
The main difference here compared to the non-probabilistic
models is that the network predicts parameters of a distribu-
tion rather than a single value. Commonly used distributions
in prior works are Gaussian distribution for real-valued data
or the negative binomial distribution for count data (Salinas
et al., 2019). When using Gaussian distribution, ψ(hi) has
two components ψ(hi)= (µ(hi), σ(hi)), that correspond
to the mean and the standard deviation, respectively. The
density is defined as:
`ψ(h)(p) =
1
σ(h)
√
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(
p− µ(h)
σ(h)
)2]
(4)
Note, that the choice of a Gaussian distribution corresponds
to the assumption that each value is normally distributed
conditioned on past values – a hypothesis which has to be
assessed per application domain. In what follows, to make
a clear distinction between the network inputs and outputs,
we usex = (x1, . . . , xt0−1) := p1:t0−1 to denote the inputs
(i.e., observed values) and y = (y1, . . . , yT+1−t0) := pt0:T
to denote the outputs (i.e., the predicted values).
Inference Performing inference for probabilistic autore-
gressive models corresponds to characterizing the joint dis-
tribution of the output sequence y. This includes estimating
n-steps ahead both, the mean and the standard deviation of
the value yn, via the first and second moments Eqθ[y|x][yn]
and Eqθ[y|x][y2n]. More generally, given the space of output
sequences Y and any statistic χ : Y → R, we consider
the task of estimating the expectation Eqθ[y|x][χ(y)]. The
main challenge here is the complexity of the underlying
integral on the distribution qθ[y|x], which is in general not
analytically solvable.
During training, one can either use scheduled sam-
pling (Bengio et al., 2015), where a single sample from the
distribution `ψ(hi)(·) is used, or avoid this issue completely
by using teacher forcing (Williams & Zipser, 1989), where
the deterministic ground truth value for yi is fed back into
the network in the next time-step. This setting is solvable
but only because the prediction is only for a single next step.
However, when performing iterated prediction at test time,
the value used in the feedback loop is sampled from the
predicted distribution of yi ∼ `ψ(hi)(·). Therefore, the next
hidden state hi+1 depends on the randomness introduced in
sampling yi. This yields an arbitrarily complex form for the
joint distribution qθ[y|x]. To address this issue, prior works
perform Monte-Carlo inference (Schittenkopf et al., 2000;
Salinas et al., 2019) to approximate the expectation as:
Eqθ[y|x][χ(y)] '
1
L
L∑
l=1
χ(yl) (5)
That is, the Monte-Carlo estimations of the expected value
of χ(y) is computed using L generated samples y1, . . . ,yL
for the output sequence.
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2.2. Extension to Bayesian Setting
We extend the probabilistic autoregressive models presented
in this section to the Bayesian setting, where the output
sequence can be conditioned on arbitrary values (i.e., both
past and from the future). Formally, we define an obser-
vation function γ : Rm → {true, false}, which takes as
input a sequence of values and outputs a boolean denot-
ing whether the observation holds. As an example, using
γ(y) = (y10 ≥ 3) denotes that we would like the model to
predict values y1:9 conditioned both on the inputs x as well
as on the observation y10 ≥ 3.
There are several cases for which the Bayesian setting is
useful: (i) some of the data is missing (e.g., due to sensor
failures), (ii) to allow encoding prior beliefs about the fu-
ture evolution of the process, or (iii) to evaluate complex
domain-specific statistics. The financial domain offer good
examples for (iii), in pricing exotic derivatives such as bar-
rier options (Rich, 1994) whose existence depends upon the
underlying asset’s price breaching a preset barrier level.
To remove clutter, in the remainder of the paper we will use
z = γ(y) to denote the output of the observation function
when evaluated on y. In this Bayesian setting, the expec-
tation Eqθ[y|x,z][χ(y)] can be estimated via Monte-Carlo
importance sampling as:
Eqθ[y|x,z][χ(y)] '
∑L
l=1 χ(y
l)qθ[z|x,yl]∑L
l=1 qθ[z|x,yl]
(6)
This corresponds to generating samples from the prior dis-
tribution qθ[y|x], and reweighing with Bayes rules. Note,
that this formula includes the former by using z = true.
3. Adversarial Attacks on Probabilistic
Forecasting Models
In this section, we present our approach for generating adver-
sarial attacks on deep probabilistic forecasting models. We
start by formally defining the problem statement suitable for
this setting and then we describe two practical adversarial
attacks that address it.
Adversarial Examples Recall that in the canonical clas-
sification setting, adversarial examples are typically found
by solving the following optimization problem (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Papernot et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017):
argmin
δ
||δ|| s.t f(x+ δ) = t (7)
where f is a classifier, x is an input (i.e., an image), t is the
desired adversarial output (the target), and δ is the minimal
perturbation (according to a given norm) applied to the input
image such that the classifier f predicts the desired output t.
To make the above formulation applicable to probabilistic
forecasting models we perform two standard modifications –
(i) we replace the hard equality constraint with an easier to
optimize soft constraint that captures the distance between
real values, and (ii) we replace the single value output with
the expected value of a given statistic of the output joint
probability distribution. Applying the first modification
leads to the following formulation:
argmin
δ
φ(f(x+ δ), t) s.t ||δ|| ≤  (8)
That is, we use a soft constraint that minimizes the distance
between the target and the predicted value, subject to a given
tolerance  on the perturbation norm. Applying the second
modification corresponds to replacing f(x + δ) with the
expected value Eq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)], where z is an observation
over outputs as defined in Section 2.2, and χ : Rm → R is
a statistic of the output sequence. Overall, this leads to the
following problem statement.
Problem Statement Let f : Rn → D(Rm) be a func-
tion (i.e., a probabilistic neural network) that takes as input
a sequence of values x ∈ Rn and outputs a probability
distribution f(x) with density q[y|x] that can be sampled
from to obtain a concrete output sequence y ∈ Rm. Given
an observation variable z, a statistic χ : Rm → R of the
network output distribution and a target t, the goal of the
adversarial attack is to find a perturbation δ that solves the
following optimization problem:
argmin
δ
φ(Eq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)], t) s.t ||δ|| ≤  (9)
3.1. Practical Attack on Probabilistic Networks
The constrained minimization problem defined in Equa-
tions 8 and 9 has repeatedly been identified as very difficult
to solve in the adversarial attacks literature (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Carlini & Wagner, 2017). As a result, we instead
follow the approach of Szegedy et. al. 2013 and solve an ad-
justed optimization problem. Given a real hyper-parameter
c ∈ R+, we aim at minimizing:
obj(δ) := ||δ||+ c · φ(Eq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)], t) (10)
via gradient-descent. The attack is run with different values
of c, and the final value is chosen to ensure that the hard
constraint ||δ|| ≤  is satisfied.
While optimizing the objective function in Equation 9 is
standard (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Kurakin et al., 2017b;a), the crucial aspect in ensuring ef-
ficient gradient descent is to obtain a good estimation of
the objective function’s gradient. In particular, this involves
computing:
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
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The difficulty of computing this gradient comes from the fact
that the expectation can not be analytically computed, but
only approximated via Monte-Carlo methods. Informally, it
raises the question of how to efficiently differentiate through
the Monte-Carlo estimation. We compare two different
ways of performing this differentiation, described next.
3.1.1. SCORE-FUNCTION ESTIMATOR
The first approach is to express the gradient of the expecta-
tion as an expectation over the distribution q[y|x+ δ, z] by
inverting the gradient and integral, and estimate the result-
ing expectation via Monte-Carlo methods. This technique
is known under different names in the literature: score-
function method (Glynn, 1990), REINFORCE (Williams,
1992), or log-derivative trick. Below we show how this
applies to our setting.
Score-function Estimator 3.1. In the general Bayesian
setting where y ∼ q[·|x+ δ, z], the score-function gradient
estimator of the expected value of χ(y) is:
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
'
∑L
l=1 χ(y
l)q[z|x+ δ,yl]∇δ log(q[yl|x+ δ, z])∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ,yl]
where yl is sampled from the prior distribution q[y|x+ δ],
and q[z|x + δ,y] denotes the probability that z is true
knowing that yl is generated.
The proof of 3.1 is given in the supplementary material.
Note that in the non-Bayesian setting where the observation
z is always true, we have q[z|x+ δ,yl] = 1 and we obtain
a simpler form:
∇δEq[y|x+δ][χ(y)] ' 1
L
L∑
l=1
χ(yl)∇δ log(q[yl|x+ δ])
While this estimator allows for generating adversarial per-
turbations, we observe that it has two drawbacks – high-
variance and high sampling complexity.
High Variance Score-function estimators typically lead
to slow convergence because they suffer from high vari-
ance (Ranganath et al., 2014). It is due to the fact that they
operate in a black-box way with respect to the gradients of
the network f and the statistic χ.
Complexity of the Bayesian Setting The score-function
requires computing the gradient of q[yl|x + δ, z] with re-
spect to δ. This is always possible in the special case when
the observation z is constantly true, however in the general
setting this might require another step of sampling, which
makes the estimator overly complex.
3.1.2. REPARAMETRIZATION ESTIMATOR
The second estimator is based on the reparametrization trick.
It reparametrizes the output distribution y in terms of auxil-
iary random variables whose distribution does not depend
on x, in order to make individual samples yl differentiable
with respect to δ. The differential ∂yl/∂δ has a priori no
specific meaning when the distribution from which yl is
sampled depends on δ. However, if yl ∼ q[·|x + δ] can
be reparametrized as yl = gx(δ,η), where η is a random
variable whose distribution is independent from δ, then it
makes sense to define the differential of yl with respect to
δ as ∂yl/∂δ = ∂gx/∂δ.
Reparametrization estimators were first proposed as a way
of mitigating the variance problems of score-function es-
timators (Salimans et al., 2013; Kingma & Welling, 2013;
Rezende et al., 2014). However, to our best knowledge, they
have not been used in a Bayesian setting where the estimator
to differentiate uses importance sampling.
Reparametrization Estimator 3.2. Assume there exists a
differentiable transformation gx(δ,η) such that the random
variable y ∼ q[·|x + δ] can be reparametrized as y =
gx(δ,η), where η is an independent random variable whose
marginal distribution p(η) is independent from δ. Then the
importance sampling reparametrization estimator of the
expectation’s gradient is:
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
'∇δ
(∑L
l=1 χ(gx(δ,η
l))q[z|x+ δ, gx(δ,ηl)]∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ, gx(δ,ηl)]
)
where for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, ηl is sampled from the distribution
p(η), and yl = gx(δ,ηl).
A proof of 3.2 is given in the supplementary material.
3.2. Reparametrization of Probabilistic Networks
Here, we discuss the question of reparametrizing probabilis-
tic autoregressive models. The stochasticity of such architec-
tures comes from the iterated sampling of yi∼`ψ(hi)(·). As-
suming a Gaussian likelihood, the value yi follows a normal
distribution N (µ(hi)|σ(hi)2). Let η = (η1, . . . , ηT−t0)
be a standard normal random vector, i.e., all of its compo-
nents are independent and each is a zero-mean unit-variance
normally distributed random variable. Iteratively writing:
yi ∼ µ(hi) + ηi · σ(hi)
for all i such that 1≤ i≤T − t0 yields a valid reparametriza-
tion. This simple reasoning applies to the particular im-
plementation described in (Salinas et al., 2019) and adapts
readily to any kind of likelihood parameterized by location
and scale, such as Laplace or logistic distribution.
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The case of mixture density likelihoods is more complex as
they do not enter this category of ”location-scale” distribu-
tions, and their inverse cumulative density function does not
admit a simple closed form. The problem of how to adapt
reparametrization to mixture densities is outside the scope
of this paper, and we refer to the relevant literature (Graves,
2016; Figurnov et al., 2018; Jankowiak & Obermeyer, 2018)
for more information about this question.
4. Case Study: Stock Market Trading
In this section, we apply the probabilistic autoregressive
models and discuss the types of adversarial attacks in the
domain of financial decision making.
Output Sequence Statistics While a given machine
learning model is typically trained to predict the future stock
prices given its past, various statistics of the output sequence
are used in downstream algorithmic trading and option pric-
ing tasks. This is the reason why the approach presented
so far already assumed presence of such statistics. The
different statistics used in our evaluation are shown in Ta-
ble 2 and include predicting cumulated stock return, pricing
derivatives such as European call and put options (Black &
Scholes, 1973), as well as an example of a binary statistic
that predicts the success probability of limit orders (Handa
& Schwartz, 1996). All statistics are defined with respect to
the last known price, denoted as x−1.
4.1. Probabilistic Autoregressive Models Performance
Before we show the effectiveness of generative adversarial
attacks, we first demonstrate that using probabilistic autore-
gressive models leads to state-of-the-art results. We use
two baselines as the current state-of-the-art for financial
predictions: LSTM networks (Fischer & Krauss, 2018), and
Temporal Convolutional Networks (TCN) (Borovykh et al.,
2017). We provide detailed description of all the training
hyper-parameters, the dataset used (S&P 500) and extended
version of all the experiments in the supplementary material.
Long-Short Trading Strategies Given a prediction hori-
zon h ∈ J1, 10K, we analyze the characteristics of the fol-
lowing portfolio: at time-step t, buy (long) the k stocks for
which the model predicts the highest gain, and sell (short)
the k stocks with the highest predicted loss. This task is
a generalization of the one presented in (Fischer & Krauss,
2018), where only direct prediction (h = 1) is considered.
Formally, we consider the cumulative return statistic
χx(y) = yh/x−1 − 1 of the output sequence, which cor-
responds to the gain of investing one dollar in the stock at
time t, and then selling at time t+ h. In a non-Bayesian set-
ting, we estimate the expectation Eq(y|x)[χx(y)] via Monte-
Carlo sampling for each stock, and buy (or sell) the stocks
Table 1. Financial gain on algorithmic trading tasks for different
horizons h and portfolio sizes k (expressed per mille o/oo). An
extended version is included in the supplementary material.
Params Non-probabilistic Probabilistic
h k TCN LSTM LSTM
(Borovykh et al., 2017) (Fischer & Krauss, 2018) This Work
1 10 3.53 (± 0.49) 4.89 (± 0.39) 4.37 (± 0.51)
1 30 1.74 (± 0.30) 2.41 (± 0.24) 2.35 (± 0.23)
1 100 0.70 (± 0.19) 0.93 (± 0.1) 0.99 (± 0.12)
5 10 5.57 (± 1.93) 8.86 (± 1.03) 9.02 (± 1.52)
5 30 3.40 (± 1.36) 5.34 (± 0.61) 5.66 (± 0.87)
5 100 1.64 (± 0.78) 2.47 (± 0.28) 2.70 (± 0.48)
10 10 6.21 (± 3.52) 9.68 (± 1.58) 9.55 (± 2.30)
10 30 4.28 (± 2.69) 6.39 (± 0.76) 6.63 (± 1.70)
10 100 2.09 (± 1.58) 3.12 (± 0.52) 3.48 (± 1.03)
for which the estimate is the highest (or the lowest). Note
that this setting also applies to the deterministic baselines,
it suffices to consider that q(y|x) is a Dirac distribution
centered in the deterministic prediction.
The performance of all models is summarized in Table 1.
We can see that the TCN is consistently outperformed by
both probabilistic and non-probabilistic LSTM models. For
the probabilistic model, we observe that it is generally out-
performed by the LSTM for direct prediction (h = 1), but
it has better performance on iterated prediction (h > 1),
provided that enough samples are used for Monte-Carlo
estimation. We observe that a large number of samples (at
least 1000) is required to match the LSTM performance. We
provide extended evaluation results in the supplementary
material, including the effect of the number of samples.
Quality of the Probabilistic Forecast Table 2 shows
evaluation of the forecast quality for each of the statistics
described earlier. To compare deterministic and probabilis-
tic forecast, we use as metric the Ranked Probability Skill
(RPS) (Weigel et al., 2007) of the prediction. However, be-
cause it applies only to predictions with finite output space,
we first discretize the output before we apply RPS2. Here,
lower score means better prediction. We provide extended
evaluation results in the supplementary material, including
multiple different values for the horizon h, price pi and the
number of samples for Monte-Carlo estimation.
2There exists a continuous version (Gneiting & Raftery, 2007),
but it is impractical for our setting because of the memory con-
sumption of computing the score: we favor metrics computable in
an on-line fashion with respect to the sampling process.
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Table 2. Definition of various output sequence statistics used in our work (left) and performance of various models used to predict them
(right). h is the prediction horizon and pi the price of the option. The comparison metric is Ranked Probability Skill (Weigel et al., 2007)
of the prediction (lower scores correspond to better predictions). An extended version is provided in the supplementary material.
Statistics Params Non-probabilistic Probabilistic
Name χ(y) h pi TCN LSTM LSTM
(Borovykh et al., 2017) (Fischer & Krauss, 2018) This Work
Cum. Return yh/x−1 − 1 10 - 1.548 (± 0.029) 1.541 (± 0.019) 1.002 (± 0.008)
European Call max(0, yh/x−1 − pi) 10 1 1.122 (± 0.002) 1.121 (± 0.002) 0.982 (± 0.005)
European Put max(0, p− yh/x−1) 10 1 1.302 (± 0.003) 1.300 (± 0.002) 0.974 (± 0.005)
Limit Sell 1
[
max(y1:h)/x−1 ≥ pi
]
10 1.05 1.516 (± 0.001) 1.514 (± 0.002) 0.940 (± 0.006)
Limit Buy 1
[
min(y1:h)/x−1 ≤ pi
]
10 0.95 1.412 (± 0.000) 1.410 (± 0.001) 0.958 (± 0.008)
4.2. Market Manipulations
The possibility of artificially influencing stock prices to
make profit has always been a major problem of financial
markets (Allen & Gale, 1992; Diaz et al., 2011; O¨g˘u¨t et al.,
2009). In our work, we focus on trade-based manipulation,
in which a trader attempts to manipulate the price of a stock
only by buying and then selling, without taking any other
publicly observable action. The core of such an attack is to
anticipate the reactions of other agents to a provoked market
event, in order to drive the price up or down. In order to
decrease the cost and visibility of the attack, an additional
constraint for the manipulating trader is to minimize the am-
plitude of the perturbation. This creates a natural connection
with finding adversarial perturbations over the inputs x.
Adversarial Attacks Scenario To measure the perturba-
tion size, we choose a variant of the Euclidean norm specif-
ically tailored to stock price data, defined in Equation 11,
where each component is normalized by the corresponding
price xi. This normalization aims at capturing the fact that
stock prices are fixed for an arbitrary unit quantity of the un-
derlying asset, and thus should be invariant with respect to
multiplication by a scalar. Besides, we add a box constraint
to the perturbed prices such that they remain positive. This
constraint is enforced using projected gradient descent.
||δ||x =
(∑|x|
i=1
(
δi
xi
)2)1/2
(11)
5. Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our approach
for generating adversarial attack on probabilistic autoregres-
sive models. The two key results of our evaluation are:
• The reparametrization estimator leads to significantly
better adversarial examples (i.e., with smaller perturba-
tion norm ) than the score-function estimator.
• The reparametrization estimator successfully generates
adversarial attacks for a number of different tasks. For
example, using a small perturbation norm  = 0.0163
the attack is powerful enough to cause financial loss
when applied to stock market trading.
Datasets We evaluate on the following two datasets:
S&P 500 dataset, which contains historical prices of S&P
500 constituents from 1990/01 to 2000/12. We consider
study periods of four consecutive years. The first three years
serve as training data, while the last year is used for out-of-
sample testing. The different periods have non-overlapping
test years, resulting in eight different periods (for each we
train four different models) with test year going from 1993
to 2000. We generate input-output samples by considering
sequences of 251 consecutive daily prices for a fixed con-
stituent. The first 241 prices serve as input x, while the
last 10 are the ground truth output y. We ensure that output
sequences from the training and test sets do not overlap
and reserve ≈ 15% of training samples as a validation set.
We use the same preprocessing as in prior work (described
in supplementary material) and train our own probabilistic
autoregressive model (described in Section 2). The order of
magnitude of the cumulated test set size is 106.
UCI electricity dataset4, which contains the electricity con-
sumption of 370 households from 2011 to 2014, down-
sampled to hourly frequency for the measurements. For this
dataset we reuse an existing implementation and already
trained models provided by Zhang and Jiang5. The model
is trained on data from 2011/01 to 2014/08 (included) and
we perform the attack on test samples from 2014/09. The
3Here,  = 0.016 corresponds to perturbing one price in the
sequence by 1.6%, or 10 prices by 0.51%, or 100 prices by 0.16%.
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/
ElectricityLoadDiagrams20112014
5https://github.com/zhykoties/TimeSeries
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Figure 1. a) Success rate of the classification attack for different perturbation norms. b) Impact of the adversarial attack against trading
strategies on financial gain, with portfolio size of k = 10. For both a) and b), standard deviation (shaded) is computed across test years
c) Under-estimation of electricity consumption for reparametrization (continuous) and score-function (dashed) estimators. For example,
the graph shows that with  = 1.0, the attack using reparametrization estimator leads to under-estimation of at least 20% (y-axis) for 70%
of samples (x-axis). d) Under-estimation adversarial samples for the electricity dataset, with  = 0.9. Red curve is the original sample,
blue curve is the generated adversarial sample. The vertical dashed line separates the input sequence from the network’s prediction.
input sequence consists of 168 consecutive measurements,
and the network predicts the next 24 values (corresponding
to the next day). The total number of test samples is 2590.
Experimental Setup We performed all experiments on a
machine running Ubuntu 18.04, with 2.00GHz Intel Xeon
E5-2650 CPU and using a single GeForce RTX 2080 Ti
GPU. For the S&P500 dataset, each model’s training time is
under one hour, and running the attack on one model for all
test-set elements of a period takes approximately 24 hours.
For the electricity dataset, running the attack on a batch of
256 test sequences takes approximately three hours.
5.1. Attacks on Buy/Sell Classification
We start by considering a classification task on the S&P
dataset where each sample is classified as buy, sell or uncer-
tain. For each stock, we predict the cumulated return using
the statistic χ(y) = yh/x−1 − 1. Then, let τ be a thresh-
old used to decide whether to buy or sell the stock. Con-
cretely, if the 95% confidence interval (assuming Student’s
t-distribution) of the estimation χ(y) is entirely above τ ,
the stock is classified as buy. If it is entirely below τ , it
is classified as sell. Finally, if τ is inside the confidence
interval, the classification is uncertain. We set τ to be the
average over all stocks of the ground truth cumulated return,
which leads to roughly balanced decisions to buy and sell.
We attack the statistic χ twice. First, we perturb all samples
initially classified as buy or uncertain, in order to make it
classify as sell. Similarly, we perturb all samples initially
classified as sell or uncertain, in order to make it classify
as buy. The target of the attack is set as τ + λ for the buy
attack and τ − λ for the sell attack. We fix λ = 0.03 in our
experiments. This is aimed at making the 95% confidence
interval fit entirely in the buy (resp. sell) zone. Indeed, with
104 samples, the interval width order of magnitude is 0.01.
The results without a Bayesian observation z are summa-
rized in Figure 1 a) and show that the reparametrization
estimator is significantly better at generating adversarial
examples that the score-function estimator. For example,
using  = 0.1 the reparametrization estimator attack suc-
ceeds in 16% more cases. The reparametrization estimator
can also successfully attack the model when considering
a Bayesian setting with similar results. We include such
experiment that uses a smaller horizon h = 5 and an obser-
vation y10/x−1 = γ in the supplementary material.
5.2. Attacks on Long-Short Trading Strategies
Next, we evaluate the impact of attacking the cumulated
return statistic χ(y) = yh/x−1 − 1 on the financial gain
of the long-short trading strategy described in Section 4.1.
We suppose that the attacker is allowed to perturb all inputs
at test time without changing the corresponding ground
truth outputs, with a maximum tolerance on the perturbation
norm. We consider a horizon of h = 10 and different
portfolio sizes k. Given a ground truth output y˜, the target
is set to be t = τ − α · (χ(y˜)− τ), where τ is the buy/sell
threshold defined previously, and α > 0 is a scaling factor
that rescales the ground truth output to the prediction range
of the network. Intuitively, this attack target corresponds to
reversing the prediction of the network around its average,
in order to swap the top and flop k stocks.
We report the return of the perturbed portfolios in Figure 1 b).
We observe that the reparametrization estimation is again
significantly better compared to the score-function estimator.
Additionally, in both experiments the thresholds for appear-
ance of adversarial perturbation to some of the samples is
approximately  u 10−2.
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5.3. Attacks on Electricity Consumption Prediction
We perturb each input sequence twice: in order to make
the consumption forecast abnormally high (resp. low). We
designate these as over-estimation (resp. under-estimation)
attack. The attacked statistic is χ(y) = yh, with h = 18.
Given an input x, we first approximate the expected value
y∗ = Eq[y|x][χ(y)], and set the target to t = (1± 0.5) · y∗
to cause over or under-estimation.
We show the attack success for different perturbation toler-
ances in Figure 1 c). We observe that the reparametrization
estimator (continuous line) yields stronger under-estimation
of the prediction than the score-function estimator (dashed-
line) In Figure 1 d), we give examples of generated adver-
sarial samples for the under-estimation attack. We observe
a recurrent pattern in the under-estimation attack, where the
perturbed prediction matches closely the original prediction
for the first time-steps, but eventually becomes significantly
inferior. In the supplementary material, we provide similar
figures for the over-estimation attack.
6. Related Work
Probabilistic Autoregressive Forecasting Models Prob-
abilistic autoregressive forecasting models have been used
in diverse applications. Schittenkopf et al. (2000) developed
the Recurrent Mixture Density Network (RMDN) to pre-
dict stock prices volatility iteratively, and were the first to
propose using Monte-Carlo methods for iterative prediction.
RMDN is based on a vanilla recurrent neural network cou-
pled with Gaussian mixture likelihood. The recent DeepAR
architecture (Salinas et al., 2019) uses several LSTM layers
with Gaussian likelihood, and has been applied to forecast-
ing electricity consumption, car traffic and business sales.
Follow-up work (Chen et al., 2019) considers an alternative
TCN-based architecture. Our characterization of probabilis-
tic forecasting models encompasses these different architec-
tures, and presents the following novelties (i) it generalizes
inference to any statistic of the output sequence, and (ii) it
extends the prior work to a Bayesian inference setting.
Stock-Market Prediction Various methods have been ap-
plied for predicting future stock prices including random
forests, gradient-boosted trees, or logistic regression. Two
notable deterministic neural models applied to this task are
TCN (Borovykh et al., 2017) and LSTM (Fischer & Krauss,
2018), which achieved state-of-the-art results. In our work,
we trained a probabilistic autoregressive model for the same
task and achieved comparable or even better results. Fur-
ther, there exists a parallel line of work that performs den-
sity estimation, but apart from the RMDN (Schittenkopf
et al., 2000), most papers restrict to prediction one-step
ahead (Ormoneit & Neuneier, 1996), or to less-expressive
and solvable dynamics such as the GARCH (Duan, 1995).
Adversarial Attacks A growing body of recent work on
adversarial attacks deals with generating small input pertur-
bations causing mis-predictions (see (Wiyatno et al., 2019)
for a survey). The objective function defined in Equation 9 is
standard in generating adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Carlini & Wagner, 2017). However, to the best of our
knowledge this is the first time that adversarial attacks are
applied to probabilistic autoregressive models. The most
related work is the adversarial training of smoothed classi-
fiers (Salman et al., 2019), where the noise applied to the
input leads to a stochastic behavior.
Robust Algorithms for Financial Decision Making The
adoption of machine learning in financial decision making
makes it crucial to develop algorithms robust against small
environment variations. Recent work here include robust as-
sessment of loan applications (Ballet et al., 2019), deepfakes
on accouting journal entries (Schreyer et al., 2019), robust
inverse reinforcement learning on market data (Roa-Vicens
et al., 2019). Adversarial attacks against stock-market pre-
diction algorithms was studied by (Feng et al., 2018). Com-
pared to the latter, our work is the first to operate on a
probabilistic network for iterative prediction.
Reparametrization The reparametrization trick has been
applied in several fields under different names: pertur-
bation analysis/pathwise derivatives (Glasserman & Ho,
1991) in stochastic optimization, stochastic backpropaga-
tion (Rezende et al., 2014), affine independent variational
inference (Challis & Barber, 2012) or correlated sampling
in evaluating differential privacy (Bichsel et al., 2018). The
actual reparametrization of our model resembles that of the
deep generative model of Rezende et al. (2014), but there it
is used to perform variational inference.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we explored applying adversarial attacks to
a recently proposed probabilistic autoregressive forecasting
models. Our work is motivated by the fact that: (i) this
model has been included in the Amazon SageMaker toolkit
and achieved state-of-the-art results on a number of different
tasks, and (ii) adversarial attacks and robustness are pressing
and important issues that affect it.
Concretely, we implemented and evaluated two techniques,
reparametrization and score-function estimators, that are
used to differentiate trough Monte-Carlo estimation inherent
to this model and instantiate existing gradient based adver-
sarial attacks. While we show that both of these techniques
can be used to generate adversarial attacks, we evidence
that using the reparametrization estimator is crucial for pro-
ducing adversarial attacks with a small perturbation norm.
Further, we extend the prior work to the Bayesian setting
which enables using these models with new types of queries.
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We provide the following three appendices:
• Appendix A provides proofs of Score-function Estima-
tor 3.1 and Reparametrization Estimator 3.2 defined in
section 3.
• Appendix B provides details of our datasets, pre-
processings steps, architectures and hyper-parameters
used in our experiments.
• Appendix C provides extended version of the experi-
ments presented in sections 4 and 5.
A. Proofs
Score-function Estimator. In the general Bayesian setting
where y ∼ q[·|x+ δ, z], the score-function gradient estima-
tor of the expected value of χ(y) is:
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
'
∑L
l=1 χ(y
l)q[z|x+ δ,yl]∇δ log(q[yl|x+ δ, z])∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ,yl]
where yl is sampled from the prior distribution q[y|x+ δ],
and q[z|x + δ,y] denotes the probability that z is true
knowing that yl is generated.
Proof. The expectation is defined as the following integral
over the output space:
Eq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)] =
∫
y
χ(y)q[y|x+ δ, z]dy
Using Leibniz rule, we obtain
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)] =
∫
y
χ(y)∇δq[y|x+ δ, z]dy
at every point δ around which the gradient∇δq[y|x+ δ, z]
is locally continuous (in the model described in this paper,
this regularity condition holds everywhere). The resulting
integral can be transformed as follows into an expectation
over the distribution q[y|x+ δ, z].
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
=
∫
y
χ(y) · ∇δq[y|x+ δ, z]dy
=
∫
y
χ(y)q[y|x+ δ, z]∇δq[y|x+ δ, z]
q[y|x+ δ, z] dy
=
∫
y
χ(y)q[y|x+ δ, z]∇δ log (q[y|x+ δ, z]) dy
= Eq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)∇δ log (q[y|x+ δ, z])]
This expectation can be approximated via Monte-Carlo
methods. While it is in general not possible to directly
sample from q[y|x + δ, z], what can be done instead is
generating samples yl for l ∈ 1 ≤ l ≤ L from the prior
q[y|x + δ], and attribute an importance weight to each of
the resulting samples, yielding:
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
'
∑L
l=1 χ(y
l)q[z|x+ δ,yl]∇δ log(q[yl|x+ δ, z])∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ,yl]
The choice of q[z|x+ δ,yl] as the importance weight for
yl results from the application of Bayes rule:
q[yl|x+ δ, z] = q[z|x+ δ,y
l]
q[z|x+ δ] q[y
l|x+ δ]
Reparametrization Estimator. Assume there exists a dif-
ferentiable transformation gx(δ,η) such that the random
variable y ∼ q[·|x + δ] can be reparametrized as y =
gx(δ,η), where η is an independent random variable whose
marginal distribution p(η) is independent from δ. Then the
importance sampling reparametrization estimator of the
expectation’s gradient is:
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
'∇δ
(∑L
l=1 χ(gx(δ,η
l))q[z|x+ δ, gx(δ,ηl)]∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ, gx(δ,ηl)]
)
where for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, ηl is sampled from the distribution
p(η), and yl = gx(δ,ηl).
Proof. Approximating the expectation Eq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
via Monte-Carlo estimation with importance sampling
yields:
∇δEq[y|x+δ,z][χ(y)]
'∇δ
(∑L
l=1 χ(y
l)q[z|x+ δ,yl]∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ,yl]
)
where yl is sampled from the prior distribution q[y|x+ δ].
With the assumptions of the theorem, we can rewrite:(∑L
l=1 χ(y
l)q[z|x+ δ,yl]∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ,yl]
)
=
(∑L
l=1 χ(gx(δ,η
l))q[z|x+ δ, gx(δ,ηl)]∑L
l=1 q[z|x+ δ, gx(δ,ηl)]
)
Since the respective effects of the perturbation and of ran-
domness are decoupled in this final expression, it is differ-
entiable with respect to δ, which concludes.
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B. Experimental Details
Here we provide details of all our experiments to support
reproducibility. Additionally, we will make all our datasets
and source code available online.
B.1. Datasets and Preprocessing
S&P500 The S&P500 dataset is obtained via the yfi-
nance API6. We focus on data-points between 1990/01
and 2000/12, identified by Fischer and Krauss (2018) as
a period of exceptionally high trading returns compared
to the following decades. We also follow Fischer and
Krauss for preprocessing the data. A sequence of prices
p = (p1, . . . , pT ) is first preprocessed to obtain a sequence
of returns (r2, . . . , rT ), defined as ri = pipi−1 −1. Intuitively
ri is the gain (when positive) or loss obtained by investing
one dollar in the stock at time i−1, and then selling at time i.
Inversely, given a sequence of returns r and an initial price
p1, the corresponding sequence of prices can be obtained as:
pk = p1
∏k
i=2(1 + ri)
Both transformations are differentiable, which allows to
perform the attack in the application space of prices rather
than on returns. Besides, returns are normalized to have
zero mean and unit variance. Denoting µ and σ for the
mean and standard deviation of returns in the training set,
the normalized sequence is (r˜2, . . . , r˜T ), where r˜i = (ri −
µ)/σ. We refer to Fischer and Krauss (2018) for a thorough
analysis of the properties of the S&P500 dataset.
Electricity Dataset We use the same preprocessing steps
as described in (Salinas et al., 2019). Input sequences are
divided by their average value v, and the corresponding
prediction sequence is multiplied by v. This guarantees that
all inputs are approximately in the same range.
B.2. Neural Architectures: S&P500 Dataset
LSTM The LSTM baseline used on the S&P500 dataset,
we follow (Fischer & Krauss, 2018), and use a single LSTM
layer with 25 hidden units, followed by a linear output layer.
However, we use only one input neuron without activation
instead of two neurons with softmax activation.
TCN In (Borovykh et al., 2017), several sets of hyper-
parameters for Temporal Convolutional Networks are used
depending on the experiment. We decided to use 8 layers
and a dilation of 2, in order to match as closely as possible
the size of the LSTM receptive field. We selected the other
parameters via grid-search, resulting in a kernel size of 2
and 3 channels. We use the TCN implementation provided
by the authors of (Bai et al., 2018).
6https://github.com/ranaroussi/yfinance
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Figure 2. Perturbation norm and distance to target for different
values of c when evaluated on the S&P500 Dataset.
Ours For our probabilistic autoregressive model, we
chose to use a single LSTM layer with 25 hidden units
similar to the LSTM baseline, in order to guarantee the
most fair comparison. We only changed the output layers
to parametrize a Gaussian distribution. Following (Bishop,
1994), we use a linear layer without activation for the mean,
and a linear layer with exponential activation for the scale
of the distribution. We also performed experiments with a
Gaussian mixture likelihood, but it did improve the perfor-
mance on our two benchmarks.
Training For both deterministic networks, we minimize
mean-squared error on the training set. For our model, we
use negative log-likelihood as a loss function. In both cases,
we use the RMSPROP optimizer (Tieleman & Hinton, 2012)
advised by Fischer and Krauss, with default parameters and
learning rate of 0.01. We use an early-stopping patience of
20, and a large batch size of 2048 for training. Experiments
with different values did not reveal a significant influence of
these parameters.
B.3. Neural Architectures: Electricty Dataset
DeepAR The DeepAR architecture used for the Electric-
ity experiments is based on a three-layer LSTM with 40
hidden units each. The number of samples used for Monte-
Carlo estimation of the output is set to 200. The network is
trained for 20 epochs with the Adam optimizer (Kingma &
Ba, 2014), with batch size of 64 and learning rate of 0.001.
B.4. Attack Hyper-Parameters: S&P500 Dataset
For the S&P500 dataset, we optimize the attack objec-
tive function with the RMSPROP optimizer using a
learning rate of 0.001 and 1000 iterations. These pa-
rameters were selected with a simple grid search be-
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Figure 3. Attack loss for different values of L when evaluated on
the S&P500 Dataset. The x-axis is the total number of generated
samples rather than the number of perturbation updates, in order
to provide a fair comparison in terms of attack computational cost.
cause of the computational cost of running the attack
repeatedly. The values used for the coefficient c are
10−2, 10−1, 1, 10, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106. We select the
value that yields the best adversarial sample under the con-
straint that the perturbation norm is below the tolerance .
The number of samples used to estimate the gradient is
chosen to be L = 50.
Buy/Sell Attack We use λ = 0.03 for the target. For
the Bayesian setting, we use γ = y10/x−1 = 1.0008, in
order to approximately balance the different classes. The
95% confidence interval is computed assuming Student’s
t-distribution. In the Bayesian case, the formula for the 95%
confidence interval with importance sampling is derived
in (Hesterberg, 1996).
Attack on Trading Strategies We use α = 0.1 for the
target scaling factor.
Influence of c In Figure 2, we examine the influence of
tuning the attack objective function on average perturba-
tion norm and distance to the attack target. We observe a
trade-off between these two quantities that depends on the
coefficient c: higher value for c yields better adversarial
samples, at the cost of more input perturbation.
Influence of L We evaluate the effect of the number of
samples L used in the reparametrization estimator on the
attack loss in Figure 3. In this experiment, the value of c is
fixed to 1000. We notice a trade-off in terms of convergence
speed vs. final loss, that depends on the number of samples
used for estimating the gradient. As a result, we choose to
use L = 50 in our attacks.
B.5. Attack Hyper-Parameters: Electricity Dataset
We optimize the attack objective function with the ADAM
optimizer. We use different optimizers for the two datasets
so that the same optimizer is used for training the network
and to attack it. We use a learning rate of 0.01 and 1000
iterations. These parameters were also selected via informal
search. The values used for the coefficient c are 0.1, 0.2,
0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, 30, 50, 70, 100, 200 and
300. The number of samples used to estimate the gradient
is chosen to be L = 50.
C. Experimental Results
C.1. Trading Strategies
In Figure 4, we provide extended results for the long-short
trading benchmark (Section 4.1), with different horizons h
and number of samples used for Monte-Carlo estimation of
the prediction. We observe that the quality of the probabilis-
tic prediction improves with the number of samples until
104 samples. Further increasing the number of samples does
not yield significant performance improvements.
C.2. Evaluation of the Probabilistic Forecast
In Table 3, we give detailed results for the comparison
of probabilistic forecasts quality with Ranked Probability
Skill (a summary of these results is provided in Table 2,
Section 4.1). We observe that the forecasting quality of our
model improves with the number of samples, and that an
order of magnitude of the number of samples needed to
obtain the best possible estimation is 104. As a comparison,
the DeepAR implementation on the electricity dataset uses
200 samples. We surmise that this discrepancy is due to
the low signal-to-noise ratio of financial data, that makes
inference more difficult.
C.3. Bayesian Attack
In Figure 5, we plot the results of the classification attack
in the Bayesian setting with observation y10/x−1 = γ,
where γ = 1.0008 (Section 5.1). We only implemented the
reparametrization estimator, as the score-function estimator
requires the overly complex estimation of∇δ log(q[yl|x+
δ, z]) for each sample yl. We observe that the attack success
rate is very similar to the non-Bayesian setting, demonstrat-
ing that the reparametrization estimator adapts readily to the
Bayesian setting. The attack success rate is approximately
80% for  = 0.1.
C.4. Electricity Dataset
In Figure 6, we show results of both over-estimation and
under-estimation attacks on the electricity dataset, with
examples of generated adversarial samples (Section 5.3).
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Figure 4. Financial gain on algorithmic trading tasks for different horizons h and portfolio sizes k (in % of the invested capi-
tal). The blue bars correspond to different number of samples for Monte-Carlo estimation of the prediction: from left to right
1, 10, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106.
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Figure 5. Success rate of the classification attack for different
perturbation norms, in a Bayesian setting with observation
y10/x−1 = γ = 1.0008, and prediction horizon h = 5.
We observe that for equal perturbation tolerance, the over-
estimation attack yields mis-predictions of smaller ampli-
tude. For instance, the reparametrization attack with  = 0.8
causes median over-estimation of around 15%, whereas it
causes median under-estimation of 20%. We believe that
this is due to the particular nature of the dataset rather than
asymmetry in the attack. We do not observe such a discrep-
ancy in the financial experiments.
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Table 3. Performance of different models on probabilistic forecast of various statistics. The comparison metric is Ranked Probability
Skill (Weigel et al., 2007) of the prediction (lower scores correspond to better predictions). The performance of our architecture is given
for different number of samples used in the Monte-Carlo estimation (1, 100, and 10000).
Statistics Non-probabilistic Probabilistic
Name h pi TCN LSTM Ours
(Borovykh et al., 2017) (Fischer & Krauss, 2018) 1 sample 100 samples 10000 samples
Cumulated
Return
1 - 1.423 (± 0.022) 1.424 (± 0.016) 2.016 (± 0.023) 0.992 (± 0.002) 0.982 (± 0.002)
5 - 1.468 (± 0.01) 1.466 (± 0.008) 1.992 (± 0.013) 1.0 (± 0.005) 0.99 (± 0.004)
10 - 1.548 (± 0.029) 1.541 (± 0.019) 1.995 (± 0.011) 1.012 (± 0.008) 1.002 (± 0.008)
European
Call Option
10 0.9 1.019 (± 0.004) 1.017 (± 0.003) 1.961 (± 0.22) 0.999 (± 0.009) 0.989 (± 0.009)
10 1 1.122 (± 0.002) 1.121 (± 0.002) 1.966 (± 0.103) 0.992 (± 0.006) 0.982 (± 0.005)
10 1.1 1.342 (± 0.002) 1.341 (± 0.002) 1.987 (± 0.03) 1.003 (± 0.007) 0.993 (± 0.007)
European
Put Option
10 0.9 1.445 (± 0.021) 1.445 (± 0.017) 1.984 (± 0.015) 1.002 (± 0.007) 0.992 (± 0.007)
10 1 1.302 (± 0.003) 1.3 (± 0.002) 1.957 (± 0.036) 0.984 (± 0.005) 0.974 (± 0.005)
10 1.1 1.046 (± 0.005) 1.044 (± 0.002) 1.856 (± 0.094) 0.968 (± 0.004) 0.959 (± 0.003)
Limit Sell
10 1.01 2.822 (± 0.501) 3.137 (± 0.307) 1.917 (± 0.021) 1.013 (± 0.008) 1.004 (± 0.008)
10 1.05 1.516 (± 0.001) 1.514 (± 0.002) 1.899 (± 0.027) 0.953 (± 0.006) 0.944 (± 0.006)
10 1.20 1.035 (± 0.003) 1.034 (± 0.002) 1.792 (± 0.12) 0.951 (± 0.006) 0.942 (± 0.005)
Limit Buy
10 0.8 1.02 (± 0.002) 1.019 (± 0.002) 1.948 (± 0.223) 0.982 (± 0.015) 0.972 (± 0.013)
10 0.95 1.412 (± 0.0) 1.41 (± 0.001) 1.926 (± 0.039) 0.967 (± 0.009) 0.958 (± 0.008)
10 0.99 3.047 (± 0.012) 3.025 (± 0.028) 1.963 (± 0.024) 1.013 (± 0.006) 1.003 (± 0.006)
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Figure 6. Results for the electricity dataset. a) Under-estimation of electricity consumption. For example, with  = 1.0, the attack
using reparametrization estimator leads to under-estimation of at least 20% (y-axis) for 70% of samples (x-axis). b) Under-estimation
adversarial samples. c) Over-estimation of electricity consumption. d) Over-estimation adversarial samples. In a) and b), results are given
for reparametrization (continuous) and score-function (dashed) estimators. In c) and d), the reparametrization estimator is used, and  is
fixed to 0.9. Red curve is the original sample, blue curve is the generated adversarial sample. The vertical dashed line separates the input
sequence from the network’s prediction.
